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Abstract
We present a new approach to edit distance attacks on certain clock-controlled
generators, which applies basic concepts of Graph Theory to simplify the search
trees of the original attacks in such a way that only the most promising branches
are analyzed. In particular, the proposed improvement is based on cut sets defined on
some graphs so that certain shortest paths provide the edit distances. The strongest
aspects of the proposal are that the obtained results from the attack are absolutely
deterministic, and that many inconsistent initial states of the target registers are
recognized beforehand and avoided during search.
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1 Introduction
The primary goal in the design of stream ciphers is to generate long pseudoran-
dom keystream sequences from a short key in such a way that it is not possible
to reconstruct the short key from the keystream sequence. This work focuses
on stream ciphers based on Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs), and
more particularly on Shrinking [1] and Alternating Step [2] generators. Both
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generators produce keystream sequences with high linear complexity, long pe-
riod and good statistical properties [3], and have been thoroughly analyzed in
several papers such as [4] and [5].
Most types of cryptanalysis on stream ciphers are performed under a known
plaintext hypothesis, that is to say, it is assumed that the attacker has direct
access to the keystream output from the generator [6]. The computational
complexity of such attacks is always compared with the complexity of the
exhaustive search, and if the former is smaller, then the cipher is said to be
broken. Although this theoretical definition can look useless, in fact it is very
important for the development and understanding of the security of stream
ciphers because many times it reveals weaknesses that might lead to practical
attacks.
The main idea behind this paper is to propose an optimisation approach that
leads to a deterministic and exponential improvement of the complexity of a
known plaintext divide-and-conquer attack consisting of three steps:
1.- Guess the initial state of an LFSR component of the generator.
2.- Try to determine the other variables of the cipher based on the intercepted
keystream.
3.- Check that guess was consistent with observed keystream sequence.
This three-step attack was first proposed in [7] and [8] by means of a theo-
retical model and a distance function known as Levenshtein or edit distance.
Furthermore, [9] proved that when the length of the intercepted sequence is
large enough, the number of candidate initial states in such an attack is small.
The approach considered in this work may be seen as an extension of the
constrained edit distance attack to clock-controlled LFSR-based generators
presented in [10] and generalized in [11]. Our main aim here is to investigate
whether the number of initial states to be analyzed can be reduced. This
feature was pointed out in [12] as one of the most interesting problems in the
cryptanalysis of stream ciphers. According to the original method, the attacker
needs to traverse an entire search tree including all the possible LFSR initial
states. However, in this work the original attack is improved by simplifying the
search tree in such a way that only the most efficient branches are retained.
In order to achieve such a goal, cut sets are defined in certain graphs that
are here used to model the original attack. This new approach produces a
significant improvement in the computing time of the original edit distance
attack since it implies a dramatic reduction in the number of initial states
that need to be evaluated. This quantitative improvement is well established
through implementation for the specific cases of Shrinking and Alternating
Step Generators. Furthermore, it is remarkable that, unlike previous attacks,
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the results obtained with the proposal of his work are fully deterministic.
This work is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces basic definitions of
Shrinking and Alternating Step Generators and essential concepts regarding
edit distances. In Section 3, some ideas for an efficient initial state selection
method are given that allow describing a method for deducing a threshold
value for the computation of the edit distance. Section 4 presents the full
description of the proposed attack. Finally, Section 5 contains specific details
for the cases of Shrinking and Alternating Generators and Section 6 provides
several conclusions.
2 Preliminaries
The Shrinking Generator (SG) is a nonlinear combinator based on two LFSRs,
introduced in 1993 by Coppersmith, Krawczyk and Mansour [1]. In this gen-
erator the bits produced by one LFSR, denoted by S, are used to determine
whether the corresponding bits generated by the second LFSR, denoted by
A, are used as part of the overall keystream or not.
The Alternating Step Generator (ASG) is a nonlinear combinator based on
three LFSRs, proposed in 1987 by Gu¨nther [13]. According to this generator
each bit produced by one of the three LFSRs, denoted by S, is used to
determine the output from the other two LFSRs A and B. In this work we
use a modified and equivalent version of the original ASG defined as follows.
If S produces a 1, then the output bit of the generator is the output bit from
the LFSR A, which is clocked. Otherwise, if S produces a 0, then the output
bit of the generator is the output bit from the LFSR B, which is clocked.
The notation used within this work is as follows. The lengths of the LFSRs
S, A and B are denoted respectively by LS, LA and LB. Their characteristic
polynomials are respectively PS(x), PA(x) and PB(x), and the sequences they
produce are denoted by {si}, {ai} and {bi}. The output keystream is {zj}.
Despite their simplicity and the large number of published attacks [14] [15] [16]
[17] [18], both generators remain remarkably resistant to practical cryptanaly-
sis because there are no known attacks that may be considered efficient enough
when the LFSRs are too long for exhaustive search. Each reference above may
be described either as a theoretical attack because it requires hard hypothesis
or/and the obtained results are probabilistic, or as an attack launched against
the hardware implementation of the generator. One of the main advantages of
this work is that it proposes a new deterministic approach to the cryptanalysis
of LFSR-based stream ciphers.
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The edit or Levenshtein distance is the minimum number of elementary op-
erations (insertions, deletions and substitutions) required to transform one
sequence X of length N into another sequence Y of length M , where M ≤ N .
Some applications of the edit distance are file checking, spell correction, pla-
giarism detection, molecular biology and speech recognition [19]. The dynamic
programming approach (like the shortest-distance graph search and Viterbi al-
gorithm) is a classical solution for computing the edit distance matrix where
the distances between prefixes of the sequences are successively evaluated un-
til the final result is achieved. When applying an edit distance attack on a
clock-controlled stream cipher, the objective is to compute the initial state of
a target LFSR that is a component of the attacked generator. As in Viterbi
search, this problem has the property that the shortest path to a state is al-
ways part of any solution of which such a state is part. We will be able to
see this fact quite clearly by the formalization of the algorithm as a search
through a graph.
Clock-controlled registers are said to work with constrained clocking when a
restriction exists on a maximum number of times that the register may be
clocked before an output bit is produced. For these registers, attacks based on
a so-called constrained edit distance have been proposed and analyzed in [7]
and [8].
In this work, two different possible models for the attacked generator, shown
respectively in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, are considered. In both cases it is assumed
that the feedback polynomial of the target LFSR is known. According to
the first model, it is assumed that Y = {yn} is an intercepted keystream
segment of length M , which is seen as a noisy decimated version of a segment
X = {xn} of length N produced by a target LFSR. On the other hand,
according to the second model, it is assumed that X = {xn} is an intercepted
keystream segment of length N , which is seen as a noisy widened version of
a segment Y = {yn} of length M produced by a target LFSR. In this latter
case, insertions in the sequence Y are indicated by two sequences S and B
so that S points the locations where the bits of B must be inserted. The
simplest examples represented by these theoretical models are SG and ASG,
respectively. Furthermore, in both cases it is not necessary to consider noise
to model the generator.
Fig. 1. Theoretical model with decimations
The main objective of the attack according to these models will be to de-
duce some initial state of the target LFSR that allows producing an in-
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Fig. 2. Theoretical model with insertions
tercepted keystream sequence through decimation or insertion, respectively,
without knowing the decimation or insertion sequences. In either case, the
attack is considered successful if only a few initial states are identified.
The use of these models implies that the known plaintext attack is applicable
not only to those generators that fit exactly such a model but also to other
sequences produced by more complex generators that generalize the given
description. In this latter case, the attack would provide a simpler equivalent
description of the original attacked generator.
An essential step in edit distance attacks is the computation of edit distance
matrices W = (wi,j), i = 0, 1, . . . , N −M, j = 1, 2, . . . ,M associated each one
with a couple of sequences X and Y where Y is the intercepted keystream
sequence and X is a LFSR sequence produced by one possible initial state.
It is remarkable that the computation of the edit distance matrix requires
choosing between both models the one that better fits the attacked generator.
If it is the first model, the intercepted sequence is Y while X is the candidate
sequence. Otherwise, if it is the second model, then the intercepted sequence
is X while Y is the candidate sequence. Also note that from the computation
of the edit distance between X and Y , the edit sequences that are computed
in the first case correspond to decimation sequences while in the second case
they correspond to insertion sequences.
Some of the parameters of such a matrix are described below. Firstly, its di-
mension is (N−M+1)·M . Furthermore, its last column gives the edit distance
between X and Y thanks to the value mini=0,...,N−M{wi,M +N−M−i}. Lastly,
each element of the matrix but the last column wi,j, i = 0, . . . , N −M, j =
1, . . . ,M − 1 corresponds exactly to the edit distance between prefix sub-
sequences x1, x2, . . . , xi+j and y1, y2, . . . , yj. The edit distance between prefix
sub-sequences x1, x2, . . . , xi+M and Y are given by wi,M + N −M − i, i =
0, . . . , N −M .
In the edit distance attack here analyzed only deletions and substitutions are
allowed. Consequently, each element wi,j of the edit distance matrix W may
be recursively computed from the elements of the previous columns according
to the formulas in Equation (1), which depend exclusively on the coincidence
or difference between the two bits xi+j and yj.
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wi,1 = Pi(xi+1, y1), i = 0, . . . , N −M
w0,j = w0,j−1 + P0(xj, yj), j = 2, . . . ,M
wi,j = mink=0,...,i{wi−k,j−1 + Pk(xi+j, yj)}, i = 1, . . . , N −M, j = 2, . . . ,M
Pk(xi+j, yj) =
 k if xi+j = yjk + 1 if xi+j 6= yj , k = 0, ..., i
(1)
Pk(xi+j, yj) gives the cost of the deletion of k bits previous to xi+j plus its
substitution by its complementary if xi+j 6= yj. Note that a maximum length
k of possible runs of decimations is assumed for constrained edit distance
matrices. It is also remarkable that at each stage the minimum has to be
obtained in order to extend the search at a next stage, which implies the need
to maintain a record of the search in the same way that Viterbi algorithm
saves a back pointer to the previous state on the maximum probability path.
In order to avoid the computation of the edit distances for all possible initial
sequences; in the following we propose a graph-theoretic approach so that
the computation of edit distances may be seen as a search through a basic
graph. Such a basic graph is a directed rooted tree where each non-root vertex
(i + j, j), i = 0, 1, , N −M ; j = 1, 2, ,M , indicates a correspondence between
the bits xi+j and yj and each edge indicates either a deletion of the bit xi+j
when j = 0, or a possible transition due to a deletion (D) or a substitution (S),
in the remaining cases. In this way, the computation of edit distances consists
in finding the shortest paths through the graph in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Basic graph
For the description of our improvement, we now define a new weighted directed
graph, here called induced graph, where the costs of shortest paths come
directly from the elements of the matrix W . This induced graph is computed
from the basic graph shown in Fig. 3 as follows. If we eliminate vertical edges in
the graph of Fig. 3 by computing the partial transitive closure of every pair of
edges of the form ((i+j−2, j−1), (i+j−1, j−1)) and ((i+j−1, j−1), (i+j, j))
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and substituting them by the edge ((i + j − 2, j − 1), (i + j, j)), we get the
graph shown in Fig. 4, which is here called induced graph.
Fig. 4. Induced graph
In this graph there are as many vertices as elements in the matrix W , plus an
additional source and an additional sink. On the other hand, the directed edges
in this induced graph are defined from the computation of the edit distances
described in Equation (1), plus additional edges joining the source with the
vertices associated to the first column of W and additional edges joining the
vertices associated to the last column of W with the sink. For instance, the
induced graph corresponding to a constrained edit distance matrix with runs
of decimations of maximum length 1 has (N −M + 1) · (2M −N + 2) vertices
and 2 · (N −M + 1) · (2M − N + 2) −M − 3 edges. Moreover, edges in the
induced graph have different costs depending on the specific pair of sequences
X and Y , and particularly on the coincidences between the corresponding
bits of both sequences, as described in Equation (1). Note that in the induced
graph, the shortest paths between the source and the sink give us the solution
of the cryptanalytic attack through the specification of both decimation and
noise sequences that can be extracted from them.
Example : For an intercepted keystream sequence Y :1101011 of length M=7
and a candidate sequence X:1110110111 of length N=10, the constrained edit
distance matrix with runs of decimations of maximum length 1 is:
W =

0 0 1 2 3 − −
1 1 1 1 2 3 −
− 3 3 2 2 2 2
− − 5 5 4 3 3

.
The graph induced by this matrix is shown in Fig. 5 where there are exactly
24 vertices and 38 edges of which the ones belonging to the 18 shortest paths
between the source and the sink are remarked in grey.
For each one of those 18 optimal paths, we obtain a possible solution to the
cryptanalysis. The computation of 18 decimation sequences S may be deduced
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Fig. 5. Shortest paths
from the above graphical representation in the following way. A horizontal edge
in an optimal path is interpreted as a 0 in a deduced decimation sequence (that
is to say, no deletion of the corresponding bit) whereas each oblique edge in
the path gives a 1 as decimation bit (corresponding to the deletion of the
corresponding bit).
S = {sn} :

0111011011 : Solution1
0111011101 : Solution2
0111011110 : Solution3
0111101011 : Solution4
0111101101 : Solution5
0111101110 : Solution6
1011011011 : Solution7
1011011101 : Solution8
1011011110 : Solution9
1011101011 : Solution10
1011101101 : Solution11
1011101110 : Solution12
1101011011 : Solution13
1101011101 : Solution14
1101011110 : Solution15
1101101011 : Solution16
1101101101 : Solution17
1101101110 : Solution18
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3 Search of Promising Initial States
The main idea behind the method shown in this Section comes directly from
the association between bits xi+j and edges of the induced graph. Since the
calculation of the minimum edit distance implies the computation of some
shortest path in such a graph, cut sets between the source and the sink in
the induced graph may be useful in order to define a set of conditions for
candidate sequences so that it is possible to establish a minimum threshold
edit distance. In this way, once an intercepted sequence fulfills some of those
stated conditions, the cost of the corresponding cut set can be guaranteed to be
minimal for some possible candidate sequence, what has direct consequences
on the costs of the shortest paths, that is to say, on the edit distances.
In this way, as soon as an intercepted sequence fulfills some specific condition
defined below, and this fact allows the description of a candidate and feasible
initial sequence, we will know that such an initial sequence will provide us
with a useful upper threshold for the edit distance and even in many cases,
such a sequence will be a minimum edit distance sequence.
The specific cut sets that we have used for the numerical results shown in this
work are defined as follows. Each cut set Ci+j, 2 ≤ i + j ≤ N − 1 contains:
(1) The set of all the arcs corresponding to the vertex xi+j.
(2) All those edges corresponding to bits xw with w > i + j whose output
vertex is one of the output vertices of the former set.
For the first model, these cut sets may be characterized by several indepen-
dent conditions on the intercepted sequence Y that may be used to guarantee
a decrease on the edit distances of different candidate sequences X. After hav-
ing checked each hypothesis separately, the tools used to check both sets of
conditions on candidate sequences X are described in terms of a pattern that
is made out of independent bits of X according to the formulas in Equation
(2).
If ∀j : 2, 3, . . . , N −M + 1; y1 = y2 = · · · = yj then yj = x1 = x2 = · · · =
xj+N−M
If ∀j : N − M + 2, N − M + 3, . . . ,M ; yM−N+j = · · · = yj−1 = yj then
yj = xj = xj+1 = · · · = xj+N−M
If ∀j : M + 1,M + 2, . . . , N − 1; yM−N+j = · · · = yM−1 = yM then yM =
xj = xj+1 = · · · = xN
(2)
For the second model, the cut sets may be characterized by different indepen-
dent conditions on the intercepted sequence X that may be used to guarantee a
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decrease on the edit distances of candidate sequences Y . After having checked
each hypothesis separately, the tools used to check both sets of conditions on
candidate sequences Y are described in terms of a pattern that is made out
of independent bits of Y according to the formulas in Equation (3).
If ∀j : 2, 3, . . . , N −M + 1; x1 = x2 = · · · = xj+N−M then x1 = y1 = y2 =
· · · = yj
If ∀j : N − M + 2, N − M + 3, . . . ,M ;xj = xj+1 = · · · = xj+N−M then
xj = yM−N+j = · · · = yj−1 = yj
If ∀j : M + 1,M + 2, . . . , N − 1; xj = xj+1 = · · · = xN then xj = yM−N+j =
· · · = yM−1 = yM
(3)
For checking previous equations (2) and (3), it is necessary to determine the
value of N , which depends on k that is the maximum length of possible runs
of decimations. For example, if k = 1, then N = 3M/2, which is the mathe-
matical expectation of N in such a case.
Note that the checking procedure of hypothesis described with the previous
Equations, applied on the intercepted sequence takes polynomial time as it
implies a simple verification of runs. The previous patterns allow discovering
promising initial states producing sequences with a low edit distance. In fact,
such a pattern provides a good quality threshold for the method that will be
described in the following Section.
4 General Attack
The threshold obtained through the pattern described in the previous Sec-
tion is a fundamental ingredient of the general attack described below. The
algorithm here developed also makes use of a new concept, the so-called stop
column, which leads to a considerable saving in the computation of the edit
distance matrices. Indeed, a stop column with respect to a threshold T may
be defined as a column j0 of the edit distance matrix W such that each one
of their elements fulfills the Equation (4).
∀i wi,j0 > T − (N −M − i), (4)
Once a minimum edit distance threshold has been obtained, we may use such
a threshold to stop the computation of any matrix W as soon as a stop column
has been detected. This is due to the fact that the edit distance corresponding
to the candidate initial state will be worse than the threshold. In this simple
way, two new improvements on the original attack may be achieved. On the
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one hand, as yet mentioned, the computation of any matrix may be stopped
as soon as a stop column is obtained. On the other hand and thanks to the
association between bits xi+j and edges of the graph, we may define a new
anti-pattern on the initial states of the target LFSR, the so-called IS-anti-
pattern. This pattern is defined from the bits that produce a stop column. It
allows us to discard the set of initial states fulfilling such an IS-anti-pattern
when an early stop column has been detected. This is so because once a stop
column has been obtained, it is possible to discard directly all the initial states
whose first bits coincide with those that produce the stop column. In order to
take full advantage of stop columns it is convenient to have some efficient way
of obtaining a good threshold, which allows us to cut many branches of the
search tree. That is exactly the effect of the pattern described in the previous
Section.
Since it is possible that the described pattern correspond only to sequences
that may not be produced by the target LFSR, in practice it is convenient
to restrict the pattern to the length of the target LFSR. So, the pattern
obtained from the first formulas of Equations (2) and (3) limited to the length
of the target LFSR is what we call IS-pattern. On the other hand, although
sequences generated through the IS-pattern have minimum edit distance, it
is possible that the corresponding obtained decimation or insertion sequences
and noise sequences are not consistent with the description of the attacked
generator. This is the reason why the proposed algorithm includes a process
of hypothesis relaxation, which implies the successive complementation of bits
of the IS-pattern until getting a positive result.
Finally, since the IS-pattern is determined by the runs at the beginning of the
intercepted sequence, if no long run exists at the beginning of the sequence,
initially the algorithm discards the first bits in the intercepted sequence before
a long run, and uses those discarded bits to confirm the result of the attack.
This idea is expressed within the algorithm by a parameter H ∈ [0, L], chosen
by the attacker depending on its computational capacity (the greater capacity,
the fewer H).
The full description of the proposed general edit distance attack is as follows.
Algorithm
Input: The intercepted keystream sequence and the feedback polynomial of
the target LFSR of length L.
Output: The initial states of the target LFSR producing sequences with a low
edit distance with the intercepted sequence, and the corresponding decimation
or insertion sequence and noise sequence.
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(1) Verification of hypothesis on the intercepted sequence described in Equa-
tion (2) or (3).
(2) While fewer than H hypothesis are fulfilled, discard the first bit and
consider the resulting sequence as new intercepted sequence.
(3) Definition of the IS-pattern according to the first L formulas in Equation
(2) or (3).
(4) Initialization of the threshold T = N .
(5) For each initial state fulfilling the IS-pattern, which has not been previ-
ously rejected:
(a) Computation of the edit distance matrix, stopping after detecting a
stop column according to threshold T and Equation (4).
(b) Definition of the IS-anti-pattern and rejection of all initial states
fulfilling it.
(c) Updating of the threshold T .
(6) For each initial state producing a sequence with minimum edit distance:
(a) Computation of the shortest paths from the graph induced by the
edit distance matrix.
(b) Translation from each shortest path into decimation or insertion se-
quences and noise sequences.
(c) Checking that the obtained decimation or insertion sequences, and
noise sequences are consistent with the attacked generator. Other-
wise, updating of the IS-pattern by complementing one of the bits in
the original IS-pattern.
Note that if the output is not the minimum edit distance sequence, the ob-
tained edit distance can be used as threshold for the stop column method in
order to find such a sequence quickly.
5 Attack on Shrinking and Alternating Step Generators
In this Section a specific implementation of the general attack presented in
the previous Section for the cases of the SG and the ASG is considered.
One of the first questions that have to be taken into account in both cases is the
limitation on the number of consecutive deletions because the longest run of
consecutive deletions in X to get Y is always shorter than the length LS of the
selector register S. This restriction implies that the equation (1) corresponding
to the computation of the edit distance matrix should be modified in the
following way:
wi,1 = Pi(xi+1, y1), i = 0, . . . , LS
w0,j = w0,j−1 + P0(xj, yj), j = 2, . . . ,M
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wi,1 =∞, i = LS + 1, . . . , N −M
wi,j = mink=0,...,LS−1{wi−k,j−1 +Pk(xi+j, yj)}, i = 1, . . . , N −M, j = 2, . . . ,M
Pk(xi+j, yj) =
 k if xi+j = yjk + 1 if xi+j 6= yj k = 0, ..., LS − 1
(5)
Equations (2) and (3) corresponding to the definition of the pattern in the
first and the second model, respectively must be also adapted to the SG and
the ASG, producing the Equations (6) and (7) respectively:
If ∀j : 2, 3, . . . , N −M + 1; y1+j/LS = · · · = yj−1 = yj then yj = xLS(j/LS) =
xLS(j/LS)+1 = · · · = xLS(j/LS)+LS−1
If ∀j : N − M + 2, N − M + 3, . . . ,M ; yM−N+j = · · · = yj−1 = yj then
yj = xj = xj+1 = · · · = xj+LS−1
If ∀j : M + 1,M + 2, . . . , N − 1; yM−N+j = · · · = yM−(N−j)/LS then yM =
xj = xj+1 = · · · = xmin(j+LS−1,N)
(6)
If ∀j : 2, 3, . . . , N −M + 1;xLS(j/LS) = xLS(j/LS)+1 = · · · = xLS(j/LS)+LS−1
then xLS(j/LS) = y1+j/LS = · · · = yj−1 = yj
If ∀j : N − M + 2, N − M + 3, . . . ,M ;xj = xj+1 = · · · = xj+LS−1 then
xj = yM−N+j = · · · = yj−1 = yj
If ∀j : M + 1,M + 2, . . . , N − 1; xj = xj+1 = · · · = xmin(j+LS−1,N) then
xj = yM−N+j = · · · = yM−(N−j)/LS
(7)
Finally, the process of hypothesis relaxation explained in the last Section must
also be used for the cases of SG and ASG when the minimum obtained edit
distance is greater than N −M since it corresponds to the presence of noise.
The following toy example is used simply to show some of the most remarkable
aspects of the proposal.
Example :
Given the situation where an attacker has intercepted the keystream sequence
Y :1011110 of length M=7 produced by a SG, and knows the following pa-
rameters:
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• LS = 3 and LA = 7
• PS(x) = 1 + x + x3 and PA(x) = 1 + x + x7
If we consider H = 3, after the verification of hypothesis from Equation (2) on
the intercepted sequence we find that none of them is fulfilled, so we discard
the first bit and check the hypothesis on the resulting sequence. In the sequence
of length 6 only two hypotheses are fulfilled, so again we discard the first bit
and consider the resulting sequence as new intercepted sequence Y :11110 of
length M=5 because it fulfills 3 hypothesis.
If we consider N=10, the IS-pattern according to the first formulas in Equation
(2) corresponding to the cut sets shown in Fig. 6 for this new sequence X is
given by IS-pattern: 111111x
Fig. 6. Cut sets
Given Y :11110, for each initial state fulfilling the IS-pattern, the edit distance
matrix is computed:
• Initial state: 1111110, X:1111110101 and W =

0 0 0 − −
1 1 1 1 −
2 2 2 2 −
− 3 3 4 4
− 4 5 4 4
− − 5 6 6

.
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The threshold is updated by the edit distance T = 5
• Initial state: 1111111,X:1111111010 and W =

0 0 0 − −
1 1 1 1 −
2 2 2 2 −
− 3 3 3 3
− 4 4 5 5
− − 6 5 5

.
For both initial states we get the same minimum edit distance N − M=5.
However, when we recover the shortest paths from the source to the sink in
the graphs induced by the edit distance matrices, we get the following. On the
one hand, in the first case, the shortest paths correspond to non-possible dec-
imation sequences according to the parameters of the attacked generator. On
the other hand, the second initial state provides fifty-four shortest paths, and
only two of them correspond to possible decimation sequences S: 0011101001
and S:1001110100 that are consistent with PS. However, if we try to confirm
these solutions with the first two discarded bits of the intercepted sequence,
we get that none of them are consistent with those bits.
Consequently, according to the algorithm, the IS-pattern has to be updated
by complementing any of the bits in the original IS-pattern. For instance, con-
sider the new IS-pattern: 111110x. For this new IS-pattern again there exist
two initial states fulfilling the IS-pattern for which minimum edit distances
equal to 5 are computed. However, only the second initial state 1111101 pro-
vides a valid decimation sequence S: 0011101001 that is consistent both with
the parameters of the generator and with discarded bits, so this solution is
accepted as a valid solution for the cryptanalysis. On the other hand, if we up-
date the IS-pattern by complementing for instance the first bit instead of the
last bit, we obtain another new IS-pattern: 011111x, and the resulting initial
state and decimation sequence are 0111111 and S:0100111010, respectively.
In conclusion, the attack of this example has been successful alter the evalu-
ation of only 4, out of 128, promising initial states.
6 Simulation Results
The next table shows some results for experimental sequential implemen-
tations of the algorithm against shrunken sequences. The columns denoted
Seq.pat. display the number of sequences that fulfill the IS-pattern. Cases
marked with * indicate the existence of initial states fulfilling the IS-pattern
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and producing sequences X that are solutions. Thres. and Dist. are the columns
where the obtained threshold and the minimum edit distance are shown.
From these randomly generated examples, we may deduce a general classifi-
cation of inputs into several cases. The best ones correspond to IS-patterns
which directly identify solutions. On the contrary, bad cases are those ‘miss-
ing the event’ cases in which the IS-pattern fails to identify any correct initial
state. Such cases are generally associated with long runs at the beginning of
the sequences Y . Finally, the medium cases are those for which, despite the
non existence of solutions fulfilling the pattern, a good threshold is obtained.
Such cases allow a good percentage of saving in computing thanks to the de-
tection of many early stop columns.
N M LA 2
LA Seq.pat. Thres. Dist.
20 15 7 128 0 - 5
30 20 9 512 1 11 10
33 22 7 128 2* 12 12
75 50 7 128 8 29 27
150 100 9 512 32 57 55
300 200 11 2048 128 166 164
300 200 13 8192 128 115 114
450 300 13 8192 128 176 171
450 300 14 16384 1024 173 171
450 300 16 65536 256 173 171
750 500 14 16384 1024* 291 291
Figure 7 shows a logarithmic plot with a comparison between 2LA and Seq.pat.
obtained from the simulation. According to those data we may estimate that
the proposed algorithm produces the solution in O(2LA/2) time instead of the
O(2LA) time corresponding to the exhaustive search that implied the origi-
nal attack [20]. These positive results are consequence of early detected stop
columns. Furthermore, it is clear that the worst outputs appear when the
initial results in steps 1 to 4 are not adequate as there are no initial states
fulfilling the IS-pattern. However, we conjecture that even in these cases that
require more computation, it is guaranteed that the solution is always ob-
tained. Even though it depends on the obtained pattern, from the number of
branches that are cut off we may estimate that the average reduction of states
to be explored is 96%. This is reflected in a reduction of more than 25% in
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Fig. 7. Logarithmic plot of simulation results
the time complexity of the attack.
Note that as aforementioned, the proposed algorithm not always output the
minimum edit distance sequence (cases that are here denoted by an *) but
however, since the hypothesis on Y are independent, the groups of bits in the
IS-pattern are also independent and consequently, the conditions might be
considered separately in such way that we might define in this way a relaxed
IS-pattern which might lead to sequences that fulfill them. In addition, we may
identify some characteristics of patterns and cases where the improvement is
more dramatic. In particular, empirical results have shown that intercepted
sequences Y with short runs at the beginning cause a greater improvement in
the time complexity of the attack. Thus, another way to avoid a bad behaviour
of the original algorithm is by choosing sub-sequences from the intercepted
sequence Y that have no too long runs at the beginning, and by applying the
algorithm to each one of these sub-sequences.
7 Conclusions
In this work a new deterministic approach to the cryptanalysis of LFSR-based
stream ciphers has been proposed. In particular, a practical improvement on
the edit distance attack on certain clock-controlled LFSR-based generators
has been proposed, which reduces the computational complexity of the original
attack because it does not require an exhaustive search over all the initial states
of the target LFSR.
The main tool used for the optimization of the original attack was the defi-
nition of graphs where optimal paths provide cryptanalytic results and of cut
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sets on them that have been used to obtain a useful threshold to cut the search
tree.
An extension of this article, which is being part of a work in progress, takes
advantage of the basic idea of using cut sets to improve edit distance attacks
against generalized clock-controlled LFSR-based generators. In order to do
this, the three edit operations are considered and the resulting cut sets on
the corresponding induced graph allow the identification of promising initial
states.
References
[1] Coppersmith, D., Krawczyk, H. and Mansour, H. (1994): The Shrinking
Generator. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 773 Springer-Verlag: 22-39.
[2] Golic, J.D. and Menicocci, R. (2004): Correlation Analysis of the Alternating
Step Generator. Design Codes and Cryptography 31 (1): 51-74.
[3] Gollmann, D. and Chambers, W.C. (1989): Clock-Controlled Shift Registers: A
Review. IEEE Transactions on Selected Areas in Communications SAC-7 May:
525-533.
[4] Simpsom, L., Golic, J.D. and Dawson, E. (1998): A Probabilistic Correlation
Attack on the Shrinking Generator. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1438,
Springer-Verlag: 147-158.
[5] Kanso, A. (2003): Clock-Controlled Shrinking Generator of Feedback Shift
Registers. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2727, Springer-Verlag: 443-451.
[6] Johansson, T. (1998): Reduced Complexity Correlation Attacks on Two Clock-
Controlled Generators. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1514 Springer-
Verlag: 342-356.
[7] Golic, J.D. and Mihaljevic, M.J. (1991): A Generalized Correlation Attack
on a Class of Stream Ciphers Based on the Levenshtein Distance. Journal of
Cryptology 3, No. 3: 201-212.
[8] Golic, J.D. and Petrovic, S. (1993): A Generalized Correlation Attack with a
Probabilistic Constrained Edit Distance. Lecture Notes in Computer Science
658 Springer-Verlag: 472-476.
[9] Jiang, S. and Gong, G. (2002): On Edit Distance Attack to Alternating Step
Generator. Technical Report Corr2002-28, University of Waterloo
[10] Petrovic, S. and Fu´ster, A. (2004): Clock Control Sequence Reconstruction in
the Ciphertext Only Attack Scenario. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3269,
Springer-Verlag: 427-439.
18
[11] Caballero-Gil, P. and Fu´ster-Sabater, A. (2005): Improvement of the Edit
Distance Attack to Clock-Controlled LFSR-Based Stream Ciphers. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science 3643 Springer-Verlag: 355-364.
[12] Golic, J.D. (1998): Recent Advances in Stream Cipher Cryptanalysis.
Publication de l’Institut Mathematique Tome 64 (78) : 183-204.
[13] Gu¨nther, C.G. (1988): Alternating Step Generators Controlled by De Bruijn
Sequences. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 304, Springer-Verlag: 5-14.
[14] Daemen, J. and Van Assche G. (2005): Distinguishing Stream Ciphers with
Convolutional Filters.Cryptology ePrint Archive Report 039.
[15] Golic, J.D. (2005): Embedding probabilities for the Alternating Step Generator.
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, Volume 51, Issue 7, July: 2543-2553.
[16] Gomulkiewicz, M., Kutylowski, M. and Wlaz, P. (2006): Fault Jumping Attacks
against Shrinking Generator. Complexity of Boolean Functions (Ed. M. Krause,
P. Pudla´k, R. Reischuk, D. van Melkebeek), N. 06111, Dagstuhl Seminar
Proceedings.
[17] Zhang, B., Wu, H., Feng, D. and Bao, F. (2005): A Fast Correlation Attack on
the Shrinking Generator. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3376, Springer-
Verlag: 72-86.
[18] Jabri, A. Kh. Al (1996): Shrinking generators and statistical leakage. Computers
& Mathematics with Applications 32, Issue 4, Elsevier Science: 33-39.
[19] Gusfield, D. (1997): Algorithms on strings, trees, and sequences: computer
science and computational biology, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY,
USA.
[20] Pighizzini, G. (2001): How Hard is Computing the Edit Distance?. Information
and Computation 165: 1-13.
19
